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Thereafter, Ideal served discovery on Mr. Donald on May 14, including requests 
for admissions. On July 2, after the discovery went unanswered, Ideal filed a motion to 
compel. Because Mr. Donald did not respond to the motion, the Court considered it 
unopposed under Practices and Procedures Rule 4.02, and pursuant to Tennessee 
Compilation Rules & Regulations 0800-02-21-.16(2) decided it on the written materials. 
The Court ordered Mr. Donald to answer interrogatories and requests for production by 
July 30. 
On July 25, Ideal filed a "Motion to Deem Employer's Requests for Admissions to 
Employee as Admitted," asserting that Mr. Donald had not responded to the requests 
served on May 14. Mr. Donald did not respond to that motion. On August 8, the Court 
granted it, holding that Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 36 does not specifically 
provide for an order deeming requests admitted, but the rule deems requests admitted if 
they remain unanswered more than thirty days from service. 
On August 24, Ideal filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 2, Mr. 
Donald filed a response and contemporaneously filed a motion to permit withdrawal or 
amendment of the admissions, along with a motion to continue the Expedited Hearing set 
for October 15. On October 9, he filed answers to the interrogatories and requests for 
production ordered by the Court to be answered by July 30. 
Summary Judgment Hearing 
At the hearing, the Court continued an expedited hearing set on October 15 
pending resolution of the summary judgment. The Court also determined that Mr. 
Donald's motion to withdraw admissions bore directly on the summary judgment motion. 
For judicial economy, and by the parties' consent, the Court heard argument on both that 
motion and the motion for summary judgment. 
Ideal's Position 
In opposing Mr. Donald's motion to withdraw, Ideal argued Mr. Donald's mere 
failure to answer the requests did not justify allowing their withdrawal. It said the 
purpose of serving the requests was to "narrow down" the facts at issue. Further, Ideal's 
counsel pointed to correspondence to Mr. Donald's counsel two weeks before filing the 
motion. That correspondence, which produced no response, inquired if the answers were 
forthcoming. 
As to the summary judgment, Ideal asserted the following undisputed material 
facts with citations to the record: 
1. Employee sustained injuries on October 10, 2017, when he was sprayed in 
his face and eyes while disconnecting a chemical hose. 
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2. The Dispute Certification Notice issued by the Department of Labor on 
April 5, 2018, identified disputed issues as "Compensability," "Medical 
Benefits," and "Temporary Disability Benefits." 
3. On August 8, 2018, the Cowt ordered that the matters addressed in 
Employer's Requests for Admissions are to be deemed admitted by 
operation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36, and that Employer 
may introduce said Requests for Admissions at any hearing of the matter 
in accord with the Court's Order. 
4. Employer consistently enforced safety rules pertaining to the use of 
Personal Protective Equipment ("PPE"), and Employee was aware that 
violation of these safety rules could result in disciplinary action. 
Ideal argued these facts conclusively established Mr. Donald violated a safety rule 
in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-llO(a), which prevented his 
recovery of benefits. It pointed specifically to the following material facts as established 
by the admissions: 
• Ideal required all drivers to attend hazardous materials regulation training 
and regular safety meetings where rules and procedures regarding PPE 
were discussed; 
• Mr. Donald attended and completed training classes regarding hazardous 
materials including self-protection measures, accident prevention 
procedures, and safety; 
• Ideal regularly conducted safety training including the use of PPE prior to 
the date of injury; 
• Mr. Donald told an investigator he was wearing safety glasses and a face 
shield at the time of injury, but Ideal later obtained a video showing he was 
not wearing glasses and had the shield in the "flipped-up" position rather 
than over his face; 
• Mr. Donald intentionally violated Ideal's safety protocol by failing to 
utilize the PPE at the time of the accident and provided false and 
misleading information to the investigator; 
• Mr. Donald understood the risk of exposure to sodium hydroxide and 
understood the risk of not wearing his PPE; and 
• If Mr. Donald had properly worn his PPE, he would not have been sprayed 
in the face with sodium hydroxide, and he had no valid excuse for not 
wearing the PPE. 
Ideal also submitted the affidavit of another driver, employed by Ideal since 1975. 
He confirmed the company requires attendance at annual hazardous materials training 
and at periodic driver safety meetings that include a discussion of the proper use of PPE. 
An affidavit from Michael Blwton, Ideal's plant manager, confinned that Ideal required 
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d1ivers to use safety glasses and a properly positioned face shield. He noted he had no 
occasion to enforce the mle regarding use of PPE because no violations had occurred. 
Mr. Donald's Position 
Mr. Donald admitted, through counsel, that Ideal served the Requests for 
Admissions on May 14 and he did not answer them until July 26. However, Tennessee 
Rules of Civil Procedme 36.02 allows the Court to withdraw matters admitted in requests 
for admissions. Mr. Donald argued that unless this Comt does so, "the merits of 
Employee's position will not be heard by the Comt." If the Comt does not consider Mr. 
Donald's "actual responses," then "presentation of the merits of this action will be 
subserved." Counsel also argued that she did not receive notice of a hearing on the 
motion to deem the requests admitted but, if she had, she might have appeared and 
"addressed the issues contained therein." Finally, counsel said she did not receive the 
Comt' s August 8 order deeming the requests admitted but admitted she did not access TN 
Comp, the Comt's electronic filing system, until September 27. 
Mr. Donald admitted Ideal's undisputed facts except for the fourth, namely that 
Ideal consistently enforced safety rules regarding the use of PPE. He based this dispute 
on his unswom answers to Interrogatories filed just ninety minutes before the hearing. He 
also set forth arguments in a memorandum of law filed on October 2 with citations to the 
yet to be filed interrogatories and his July 26 answers to requests for admissions. In an 
affidavit, he said he wore his face shield in the "flipped-up" position on the date of the 
accident but also "believed" he would have suffered the injury even if the shield was 
lowered. 
Analysis 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2018)(Emphasis added). A party 
may move for summary judgment "at any time after the expiration of thirty (30) days 
from the commencement of the action." Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 56.01; Noel v. EAN Holdings, 
LLC, 2017 Tenn. Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 58, at *7 (Sep. 13, 2017). 
Ideal must do one of two things to prevail on its motion for summary judgment: 
(1) submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of Mr. Donald's claim, 
or (2) demonstrate that Mr. Donald's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential 
element. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2017); see also Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of 
Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). If Ideal is successful in meeting 
this bmden, Mr. Donald "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] 
pleading." Id. at 265. Rather, he must respond by producing evidence that sets forth 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. He 
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must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts. Rye, at 265. He must also produce this evidence at least five days before the 
hearing. Tenn. R. Civ. P 56.04. The Court must review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Donald as the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 
favoring him. Payne v. D and D Elec., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 21, at *12 
(May 4, 2016). 
Here, Ideal contends there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Mr. Donald's 
intentional violation of a safety rule and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
1 lO(a) prohibits the recovery of benefits. The Court agrees. 
I. 
First, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 36.01 provides that a party may serve a 
written request to another party to admit the truth of any fact, the application of law to the 
facts, or opinions about either. Every request is admitted unless the party to whom the 
request is directed serves a written answer or objection within thirty days after service of 
the request. "The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the 
reasons why the answering patty cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter." Id. 
Tennessee law considers Rule 36 a "useful tool in the preparation of a lawsuit." 
Tennessee Dept. of Human Serv. v. Barbee, 714 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tenn. 1986). It 
provides a procedure "to reduce trial time by limiting and narrowing the issues." Id. A 
matter admitted under Rule 36 "is conclusively established unless the court on motion 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 36.02. 
Procedurally, admissions under Rule 36 may be brought to the trial court's attention 
through a motion for summary judgment or by specific motion dealing with the requested 
admissions. Barbee, at 266. 
In this case, Ideal filed a motion to deem the unanswered requests admitted 
because Mr. Donald did not answer them within thirty days. He did not answer them until 
July 26, after the motion to deem them admitted, and after a motion to compel answers to 
other discovery. Ideal corresponded with Mr. Donald regarding the unanswered requests 
before filing its motion. Thus, the Court holds Ideal conclusively established the facts 
contained in the requests for admissions for purposes of this action. 
II. 
Second, the Court declines to permit withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. 
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 36.02 provides the Court discretion to allow 
withdrawal and that discretion provides a modicum of flexibility to avoid potential 
injustice resulting from a strict and unyielding application of the thirty day response 
deadline. Meyer Laminates (SE) , Inc. v. Primavera Dist., 293 S.W.3d 162 (Tenn. Ct. 
5 
App. 2008). To obtain relief, a party must satisfy the following two prongs: 1) "when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved [by allowing the admissions to 
stand]" and 2) "the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense 
on the merits." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 36.02. The Rule applies to "any matter admitted" under 
Rule 36, without distinction as to how or for what reason the matter was deemed 
admitted .. Meyer, at 167. 
To determine whether it should allow withdrawal of Mr. Donald's admissions, the 
Court finds guidance in Hutcheson v. Irving Materials, Inc., No. M2002-03064-COA-R3-
CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2004). There, the plaintiff did 
not respond to requests for admissions and the defendant filed a motion to deem them 
admitted. Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion but submitted responses to the 
requests on the day of the hearing. The court granted the motion. Several months later, 
and after the filing of a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff filed a motion for relief 
under Rule 36.02. The court held that the delay in requesting relief until after a summary 
judgment filing "failed to establish that the merits of the case would be subserved or 
promoted by the withdrawal or modification of the requests for admissions." Id at * 10. 
The same is true here. Mr. Donald did not timely answer the requests and did not 
reply to the motion to deem them admitted. He filed his motion to withdraw almost two 
months after the Court deemed them admitted and only after Ideal filed its motion for 
summary judgment. 1 As in Hutcheson, the Court finds that the merits of the case are not 
subserved by refusing to allow Mr. Donald to withdraw or amend his admissions. 
Likewise, Ideal convincingly argued that it used the request for admissions to narrow the 
issues as Rule 36 was intended. Barbee, at 266. The Court holds allowing withdrawal of 
the admissions here would thwart the purpose of Rule 36 and impose upon Ideal a burden 
of establishing facts that it sought to establish by use of requests for admissions. Rule 36 
would cease to be a "useful tool" if a court allowed withdrawal of requests for admissions 
under the circumstances presented here. Thus, the Court exercises its discretion and 
denies Mr. Donald's request to withdraw the admissions. 
III. 
Finally, the Court holds Ideal is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
because there is no genuine issue of material fact. Ideal negated an essential element of 
Mr. Donald's claim, causation, by establishing intentional violation of a safety rule, and 
l The Court reviewed computer screenshots submitted by Mr. Donald's counsel purporting to show she did not 
receive notice of the Court's August 8 order deeming the requests admitted. To the contrary, the Court notes the 
screenshots include an e-mail to counsel of August 8 that references a "Court Order" of that date and advising it 
might be viewed in TN Comp. Counsel admitted she did not take steps to access TN Comp until September 27. 
Regardless, counsel conceded she received the motion to deem the requests admitted and any failure to receive 
and/or review the order deeming them admitted does not affect the outcome here. 
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demonstrated Mr. Donald's evidence is insufficient to establish causation in light of the 
defense. 
First, Ideal negated causation by establishing the elements of a safety rule defense 
as set forth in Mitchell v. Fayetteville Pub. Util., 368 S.W.3d 442 (Tenn. 2012). 
Specifically, it established: 
1) Mr. Donald's actual notice of a safety rule; (Admission Nos. 1, 2, 3,5) 
2) Mr. Donald's understanding of the danger involved in violating the rule; 
(Admission Nos. 15, 16) 
3) Its bona fide enforcement of the rule; (Affidavit of Michael Blurton) and 
4) Mr. Donald's lack of a valid excuse for violating the rule. (Admission No. 18) 
Second, Ideal demonstrated Mr. Donald's evidence was insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. In Barbee, the Court explained that a 
coutt should not allow evidence to refute facts conclusively established by an admission. 
714 S.W.2d at 267. However, even ifthe Court considered Mr. Donald's evidence, he did 
not refute the facts established by the admissions. He filed interrogatory answers on the 
morning of the hearing, not five days before as required by Rule 56.04 and, even then, 
they were unswom. Further, in his affidavit, Mr. Donald offered only two statements, 
neither of which is sufficient to create a fact issue. Namely, he conceded he was wearing 
his face shield in the "flipped-up" position instead of covering his face and two, he said 
he believed he would have suffered injury even if the shield was lowered. These facts 
were conclusively established to the contrary by Admission No. 20 where he admitted 
that "if proper safety protocol had been followed ... [he] would not have been sprayed in 
the face by sodium hydroxide" and in Admission No. 21 where he admitted "if [he] had 
properly utilized the safety devices . . . [he] would not have sustained bums to [his] face 
and eyes." 
Based on the above findings, the Court holds there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and Ideal is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
I. Ideal's Motion for Summary judgment is granted, and Mr. Donald's claim against 
Ideal for the requested workers' compensation benefits is dismissed on the merits 
with prejudice to its refiling. 
2. Ideal shall prepare and file a statistical data form (SD2) with the Court Clerk at 
wc.courtclerk@tn.gov within ten business days of entry of this order. 
3. The filing fee of $150.00 for this case is taxed to Ideal under Tennessee 
Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07. 
4. Absent an appeal, the order shall become final thirty days after issuance. 
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ENTERED this the 17th day of October, 2018. r, 
Judge Allen h 1ps 
Court of Workers' Com pen a ti on Claims 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Order was sent to the following 
recipients by the following methods of service on this the 17th day of October, 2018. 
Name Via Email 
Emily B. Bragg, Esq., x 
Employee's Attorney 
Steven B. Morton, Esq., x 
Employer's Attorney 
Service sent to: 
ebragg@forthepeople.com 
Stephen.morton@mgclaw.com 
Penn hrum, Clerk of Court 
Court ofWorkers' Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 
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